Executive summary
Organizations can no longer delay their migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Those that wait face a rushed transition, PQC compliance pressure, and competitive disadvantages. Their high-value data and digital trust are also at risk as adversaries take advantage of “harvest now, decrypt later” and “trust now, forge later” tactics.
Many security leaders acknowledge that quantum computing could eventually undermine today’s public-key cryptography. Yet they defer action because that capability feels distant and uncertain while more pressing threats — such as ransomware and identity-based attacks — keep their security teams plenty busy.
However, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is no longer solely a future concern, especially for federal contractors. Converging forces are making it an immediate priority:
- Deadlines for federal agencies’ PQC compliance are locked in, largely due to the recent Executive Order 14412.
- The timeline for the arrival of cryptographically relevant computers keeps narrowing.
- Confidential data with a long shelf life is already at risk from adversaries harvesting it today for potential decryption when cryptographically relevant computers are available.
Although no concrete PQC requirements exist yet for primary contractors and other federal supply chain vendors, federal agencies will likely start imposing them through the procurement process before 2030. But even organizations that are not subject to government mandates can’t afford delays. Those who are waiting for the frameworks to finalize or for “Q-Day” timelines to become more certain are putting themselves at both operational and competitive risks.
Risk 1: Rushed, compressed PQC migration
Migration to quantum-safe cryptography is not a simple software upgrade. Cryptography is embedded across multiple layers of the technology stack, from firmware and hardware to applications and protocols. Likewise, the transition to PQC involves many layers of the organization because it impacts operational continuity and relies on cross-functional collaboration.
Planning and executing the initial phases of PQC implementation will take large organizations — or those running their own IT —a combined four to six years, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre estimates. This includes discovering your cryptographic inventory, assessing posture, creating a PQC migration plan, coordinating with vendors, replacing cryptographic libraries, and implementing other technical changes. You’ll also need organizational alignment, including leadership buy-in to prioritize quantum safety and allocate budget.
Many security and compliance teams are nowhere near the schedule they need to be on. In the defense sector, for example, only 43% of organizations planned to initiate a formal PQC adoption within the next two years, according to a Capgemini survey. Nearly half said they recognized the need but hadn’t prioritized it yet and didn’t expect to initiate a plan for another three to five years.
Attempting a complex, multi-year project on a compressed timeline is more likely to create problems. Those that delay may face higher costs, rushed technology choices, interoperability failures, and greater operational risk as customer or regulatory deadlines approach.
Risk 2: The threat of ‘harvest now, decrypt later’ attacks
Security experts have warned that well-resourced threat actors may already be collecting encrypted data with a long sensitivity life to decrypt it when quantum computers can break current encryption. Global connectivity and low-cost data storage enable adversaries such as nation-state actors to launch these “harvest now, decrypt later” (HNDL) attacks at scale.
Academic research shows that HNDL attacks are economically viable across major TLS and SSH protocols. Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 researchers have observed HNDL-like behavior in the wild, with attackers rapidly exfiltrating data in massive quantities earlier in an intrusion.
Attackers’ speed has also gone up, giving security teams much less time to prevent data exfiltration: Separately, Unit 42 found that exfiltration time has decreased from 285 minutes in 2024 to 72 minutes in 2025. The challenge of detecting an intrusion and preventing exfiltration is even worse if the data is protected by non-PQC algorithms.
Information that needs to remain confidential for the next 10-15 years is especially at risk because it may retain its value into the quantum era. This includes the type of data that federal contractors often handle, such as government records and defense communications.
Organizations acknowledge this risk but are not necessarily acting on it. A Ponemon study found that 59% of security practitioners are concerned about the exposure of long-term sensitive data, yet only 38% are actively preparing for post-quantum.
Risk 3: Broken digital trust
A less discussed but equally significant threat is what security experts call “trust now, forge later” (TNFL). While HNDL compromises data confidentiality, TNFL undermines the authenticity of digital signatures. These signatures are fundamental to establishing trust in software, identities, and communications, including through code-signing certificates and certificate authorities.
Adversaries could retain public keys used today until quantum computers are capable of deriving the corresponding private keys. They could then forge signatures to impersonate legitimate vendors, identities, or networks.
This threat is relevant now because many systems use certificates with long lifetimes. Signed software, devices, trust anchors, records, and identity systems may remain in service for years. An adversary who captures a public key and digital signature today could impersonate an organization when cryptographically relevant computers emerge.
The threat actor could assume the authority associated with the compromised signing key, producing digital signatures that would be indistinguishable from genuine ones, even if backdated. That could make it very difficult for the legitimate organization to prove that a disputed signature was forged.
For the broad segment of the federal supply chain whose systems depend on code integrity and identity verification, this risk warrants the same level of consideration as HNDL, even though it gets far less attention.
Risk 4: Vendor and supply chain gaps
Most organizations don’t build their own cryptographic systems from scratch. Their cryptographic posture is highly dependent on partners such as cloud providers, software vendors, and managed services providers. Consequently, many expect to outsource their PQC migration as well — 62% of organizations surveyed by IBM believe vendors will handle the transition requirements for them.
In principle, outsourcing quantum-safe readiness takes care of the technical aspects of the problem. But how do you know your vendors and partners have completed the necessary steps? Are you leaving governance and ownership gaps in the process? Who’s accountable for any failures? Shifting the risk to your supply chain doesn’t eliminate it.
Risk 5: Mounting PQC compliance pressure
Governments around the globe are increasing their emphasis on PQC adoption and accelerating its transition timelines. In the United States, Executive Order 14412 set hard deadlines for high-value and high-impact federal civilian systems, while CNSA 2.0 provides a transition path for National Security Systems. These timelines will likely affect the federal supply chain through the procurement process.
But organizations not directly subject to government mandates may still face comparable pressures. Customers, business partners, and insurers are focusing on PQC readiness:
- Enterprise buyers are adding PQC readiness checks to their vendor assessment and procurement processes. Among early adopters of quantum-safe solutions, 70% said they view the PQC transition as essential to remaining competitive.
- Other regulated-sector partners may flow their security requirements into their supplier contracts. Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), which applies to financial entities, is one example. Although it doesn’t explicitly mandate PQC, its requirements establish a strong case for practices such as maintaining cryptographic agility and assessing information and communication technology suppliers for PQC readiness.
- Cyber insurers are beginning to explore quantum-aware risk modeling. They may assess quantum-related cryptographic risk as an emerging underwriting consideration, including through PQC-readiness questionnaires.
This shift also creates an opportunity for compliance consultants to help their clients proactively. As more organizations start asking questions about PQC, those who can bring a credible solution to a client engagement will have a competitive advantage.
The cost of waiting could add up substantially
A delayed transition doesn’t just affect your migration timeline. A rushed process could turn migration into an emergency hardware or software replacement project or lead to accelerated overhauls of key-management systems rather than phased replacements. You may need to switch multiple suppliers and systems simultaneously.
The potential consequences are increased risk and cost — and budget constraints are already one of the top three barriers to becoming quantum-safe.
Major technology and infrastructure providers such as Google, Microsoft, and Cloudflare are already rolling out PQC across their platforms. As this transition spreads through the ecosystem organizations depend on, those that haven’t kept pace may encounter a compatibility problem.
What happens if your systems, algorithms, libraries, or protocol configurations aren’t compatible with PQC algorithms? Service outages, connection failures, and latency or capacity issues could disrupt operations and potentially erode customer trust.
Taken together, the potential for additional costs, lost opportunities, and operational disruptions could materially affect the bottom line. A phased migration that starts now helps you mitigate security, operational, and financial risks.
Taking the first step doesn’t have to be complicated
The window for a deliberate transition is narrowing. Migration takes years, while compliance, procurement, and security pressures continue to build. Starting earlier gives organizations more room to plan rather than react.
You don’t need to wait for government mandates or partner requirements to solidify your plans. The first step is the same regardless of what framework or assessment process eventually applies to your organization: understanding your risk exposure.
Ciphersound’s free tool, Cipherscan, gives you a fast, low-friction starting point to assess your cryptographic posture. Start with visibility and use concrete data to build the case within your organization.